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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, HASTINGS COLLEGE OF THE LAW
APRIL 23, 2008
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY*
For those of us who grew up in the United States, and took junior
high school civics, we learned certain constitutional axioms. We learned
that any person charged with a crime will have a fair trial before an
impartial jury. We learned that anybody who is injured has a right to his
or her day in court. These are not incidental to our constitutional system;
these are fundamental to our very notions of fairness and justice.
Over the next forty-five minutes, I would like to ask each of you-
law professors, attorneys, future attorneys-to consider how true these
axioms really are. To what extent are these really just myths that we keep
to preserve the legitimacy of the system? My thesis tonight is that the
reality is that our system does not live up to its constitutional ideals, and
that, in the over thirty years since I graduated from law school, it is
gotten much worse.
Now, to say that these axioms have become myths in some ways is
an overstatement. Obviously, every day across the country, there are fair
trials. Obviously, throughout American history, there have been those
who have never had fair access equally to the courts. Through so much of
American history a black man could not get a fair trial, especially in the
South. Poor people have never really had access to the civil justice
system. Yet I believe that increasingly the courthouse doors across the
* Dean and Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law.
Dean Chemerinsky was the featured Lecturer for the annual Marvin Anderson Lecture Series, which
is sponsored by the Hastings io66 Foundation.
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United States are being closed in both criminal and civil cases to litigants.
As troubling as that is, I think it is even more disturbing that this may
reflect an increasing loss of faith in the adjudicatory system.
We as lawyers believe in process. Maybe it is our training; maybe it
is the belief in process that caused us to want to go to law school. Great
constitutional scholars, like the late John Hart Ely, said that the
Constitution is preeminently about process.' If we are compromising
process, then we are giving up something very fundamental to our
constitutional birthright.
Tonight I want to paint with a broad brush because my thesis is that
the whole here is worse than the sum of the parts. The whole here shows
a way in which we are not a society living up to the constitutional axioms
that we still teach our children in junior high school civics.
I want to divide my remarks into three Parts. First, I want to talk
about the criminal justice system and what has gone on there, especially
over the last few decades. Then I turn to the civil justice system. Then,
finally, I consider what is going on with regard to access to the courts and
fair process as part of the War on Terror.
With regard to the criminal justice system, I remember when I was in
college and taking a political science course, learning that 90% of all
criminal defendants in the United States plead guilty. I remember being
shocked by that number because if you watched Perry Mason, which is
the show that I watched as a child and probably somewhat inspired me to
go to law school, no one ever pled guilty. Every week was a different trial
and Perry Mason always won. I did some checking before coming here,
and I learned that today, 95% of all defendants in federal court plead
guilty, and it is generally the statistic for state courts across the country as
well.' That means that the number of jury trials has been cut in half just
over the last thirty years.3 That is significant in itself.
It is tempting to believe that everybody who pleads guilty does so
because they are really guilty. If that were true, then the statistics that I
related would not be disturbing at all. But every now and then we get a
glimpse that that is not the reality at all. Several years ago there was a
major scandal with regard to the Los Angeles Police Department; you
might remember it. It was the Rampart scandal that was exposed in the
Spring of 2000. It turns out that some police officers in the Rampart
Division of Los Angeles, an almost entirely Latino area, were routinely
I. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 75 (1980).
2. See Bureau of rustice Statistics Criminal Sentencing Statistics, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/sent.htm (last visited May 17, 2009).
3. See Bureau of Justice Statistics Civil Justice Trends, http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/glance/
torttrial.htm (last visited May 17, 2009).
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planting evidence to frame innocent people.4 It came out as a part of the
investigation that a number of innocent people pled guilty.'
Why would that be? Their lawyers-even highly conscientious
lawyers-would see the possibility that their clients would be convicted
at trial and have long prison sentences. The alternative was a deal
offered by a district attorney: three to five years for a lesser crime and
time served. The lawyers understandably would say to their client: "You
can go to trial and face maybe fifteen, twenty years, or plead guilty and
be out in a couple." What responsible lawyer would not give that advice
to a client?
Just a couple of years ago I handled a case in the Fourth Circuit, and
I believed my client was innocent. He was represented by an appointed
attorney in Virginia. The attorney showed up and told him, "plead
guilty." The attorney had never looked at the file. There were countless
strong defenses that the attorney never raised. In fact, this lawyer was
disciplined by the Virginia State Bar for his negligence in this and other
cases. The lawyer's defense in his disciplinary proceeding was that he was
in the early stages of Alzheimer's disease.
I tried to argue in the Fourth Circuit defenses that my client waived
by pleading guilty. I tried, in essence, to get the Fourth Circuit to see that
my client, at least likely, was innocent. I lost. As far as Fourth Circuit was
concerned, my client pled guilty, and that was the end of the matter.
I think over the few decades since I graduated from law school, the
changes in the criminal justice system have vastly increased the
likelihood that innocent people are pleading guilty every day. I think that
is the unseen cost of things like the three strikes law, mandatory
minimum sentences, and the federal sentencing guidelines. They have
transferred a tremendous amount of power from judges to prosecutors.
The charging decision, what to charge, and whether to charge a third
strike as a crime with a mandatory minimum-mean everything in
determining the punishment. Think about it in terms, again, of rational
criminal defense lawyers and rational defendants. A defendant can be
told "plead guilty to this crime (three to five years in prison) or face
being charged with a third strike, which could then mean twenty-five to
life in prison." What criminal defendant, even an innocent criminal
defendant, would not plead guilty under those circumstances?
You can tell the same story about mandatory minimums, which are
now so common within the federal and state levels. For the criminal
defendant, the message is often the same: plead guilty to a lesser offense
or face a draconian mandatory minimum.
4. Erwin Chemerinsky, An Independent Analysis on the Los Angeles Police Department's Board
of Inquiry Report on the Rampart Scandal, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 545, 549-50 (2°0).
5. Id. at 549-50, 600.
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The federal sentencing guidelines have tremendously shifted power
from judges to prosecutors in their charging decisions. The United States
Supreme Court has contributed to this as well. Supreme Court decisions
have very much given prosecutors the ability to pressure even innocent
people into guilty pleas. Everyone who has studied criminal procedure is
familiar with North Carolina v. Alford, where the Supreme Court said it
is permissible for a person to plead guilty, all the while protesting his
innocence, so long as there is counsel present at the hearing.6 There does
not have to be more than a pro forma inquiry by the judge that the
person is knowingly pleading guilty for the guilty plea to stand and
essentially preclude all appeals.7 In a case called Bordenkircher v. Hayes,
the Supreme Court specifically said it is permissible for a prosecutor to
threaten prosecution under a habitual offender statute-like the three
strikes law-in order to induce a guilty plea. Just a few years ago, in a
case called United States v. Ruiz, the United States Supreme Court said
that a prosecutor does not have to turn over impeachment evidence to
someone who pleads guilty.'
Just last year I argued a case in the Fourth Circuit involving a man
who was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. I° He plead guilty
to the crime." He left it all in the hands of the jury in the penalty phase
and they sentenced him to death. 2 There is no doubt whatsoever that the
prosecutors in this case failed to turn over key exculpatory evidence that
was requested until two days after he pled guilty.'3 My argument, of
course, was that this should undo the guilty plea.'4 This was not merely
impeachment evidence; this was evidence that could be used to exculpate
him with regard to key elements of the charges against him. I lost in the
Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit said it could not be shown that the
jury would not have sentenced him to death anyway.' The Supreme
Court denied review." He now faces execution.
We can talk about the myth that anyone charged with a crime will
get a fair trial before an impartial jury, but I do not think we can square
it with this reality. We can say "there is a safeguard that is there. Those
who are convicted will at least have access to federal court via a writ of
habeas corpus to give them protection." But if we want to talk about how
6. 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970).
7. Id.
8. 434 U.S. 357,364-65 (1978).
9. 536 U.S. 622, 625 (2002).
in. Wilkinson v. Polk, 227 F. App'x 20, 211 (4th Cir. 2007).




I5. Id. at 218-i9.
x6. Wilkinson v. Polk, 128 S. Ct. 88x, 88i (2008) (denying certiorari).
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the courthouse door has been closed in the last decade or two, it is
especially so with regard to habeas corpus.
An article was recently written by Professor John Blume of Cornell
University where he studied some federal districts, and he found in those
districts that only 2.5% of habeas petitions were granted, or to put it
another way, 97.5 % were denied.'
7
By itself, this statistic does not tell us anything. Maybe only 2.5 % are
meritorious. And yet, if you look at what the Supreme Court and
especially Congress has done to habeas corpus, it becomes clear that
likely countless meritorious habeas corpus petitions are being thrown out
on procedures. For example, the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act says that there is a one-year statute of limitations for
bringing a habeas petition from the end of state court proceedings.
8
By itself, that sounds pretty innocuous. And then you realize that the
time the habeas petition is pending in federal court counts against that
statute of limitations.'9 So let me tell you about something that happens
all the time; it has happened in my cases. Imagine you have a very
conscientious state prisoner who files a habeas petition almost
immediately at the end of state proceedings. And the federal judge sits
on the habeas petition; fourteen months, sixteen months, eighteen
months or longer; that goes on all the time. Then imagine that that judge
dismisses the habeas petition because there was not complete exhaustion
of state remedies as required. This happens all the time, too. Forty
percent of all habeas petitions are dismissed for lack of complete
exhaustion. That person is barred from ever again filing a habeas
petition. Now, maybe there will be some doctrine of equitable estoppel;
the circuits are split on it.2" But that is the consequence of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act says, also, that a
prisoner can bring only one habeas petition unless there are
extraordinary circumstances and prior approval by a federal court of
17. John W. Blume, AEDPA: The "Hype" and the "Bite," 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 285 n.123
(2006).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(i) (2006).
I9. See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S 269, 274-75 (2005) (citing Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, i81-
82 (200)).
20. Compare Zarvela v. Artuz, 254 F.3d 374, 381-83 (2d .Cir. 2001) (equitable tolling of the
AEDPA's one-year limitation period was warranted where district court dismissed petitioner's prior
habeas petition on exhaustion grounds without staying the exhausted claims or advising him of his
right to delete the unexhausted claims), and Fahy v. Horn, 24o F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 200)
(equitable tolling warranted where petitioner made a reasonable, although ultimately mistaken,
judgment as to whether exhaustion in state court would be appropriate), with Larry v. Dretke, 361




appeals.' This too, by itself, sounds innocuous until you realize that
virtually all habeas petitions are brought pro se by prisoners. They often
do not know what claims are available to them. They might file a habeas
petition and only later learn of a much stronger claim but almost surely
they are out of luck. There are so many procedural barriers that have
been built into the law of habeas corpus-including that even the
prisoner who can get past all the obstacles still faces a very high burden
in the terms of getting relief.
The law, in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), says that a federal court can grant
habeas relief only if the state court decision is "contrary to," or "an
unreasonable application of," clearly stated law by the Supreme Court.22
Once more, this may seem innocuous until you see how it is applied.
I argued a case in the United States Supreme Court about five years
ago, a case called Lockyer v. Andrade.3 My client, Leandro Andrade,
was sentenced to life in prison with no possibility of parole for fifty years
for stealing $i5o worth of video tapes from Kmart stores in San
Bernardino, California. 4 He received this sentence, even though he had
never committed a violent crime, under California's three strikes law. 5
California is the only state in the country where the third strike does not
have to be a serious or violent felony. 6 Any felony is sufficient.
One of the many ironies, cruel ironies of this case, is that if his prior
crimes had been rape and murder, he could have been charged only with
two counts of petty theft. 7 But because his prior crimes were burglary of
unoccupied homes (property crimes), he could be charged with two
counts of what is called petty theft with a prior property crime. 8 That
then could be two felony convictions.
The prosecutor could have him charged with two counts of petty
theft; maximum of a year in jail. He could have charged him with two
counts of petty theft with a prior and not charged him under three
strikes. But the prosecutor charged him with two counts of petty theft
with a prior as felonies, both as third strikes, and he was given life in
prison with no possibility of parole for fifty years.
The California Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction and
sentence. 9 The California Supreme Court denied review," as it has done
21. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a)-(b).
22. Id. § 2254(d).
23. 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
24. Id. at 66-68.
25. Id. at 78 (Souter, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 67 (majority opinion).
27. Id.
28. ld.
29. Id. at 68.
30. Id. at 69.
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in every case under the three strikes law challenging sentences as cruel
and unusual punishment.3 He filed a pro se habeas petition, which was
denied." I was appointed to represent him in the Ninth Circuit, and the
Ninth Circuit ruled in his favor two to one.33 The State of California
sought certiorari and the United States Supreme Court, five to four,
reversed the Ninth Circuit and ruled against Andrade.'
Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion for the Court, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Thomas.
Justice O'Connor's opinion focused on that language from § 2254(d) that
I quoted.35 She said in order to be contrary to a Supreme Court
precedent, in order to be contrary to a clearly established law, it has to be
contrary to a Supreme Court precedent that is on point. 6 I thought I was
in great shape here. There was a Supreme Court decision called Solem v.
Helm.37 It involved a man in South Dakota who was sentenced to life in
prison with no possibility of parole for passing a bad check, worth $I00.38
The Supreme Court had declared his sentence to be cruel and unusual
punishment.39 That seems to show that the California decision upholding
Andrade's sentence was contrary to clearly established law by the
Supreme Court.
Justice O'Connor rejected that argument. She said in Solem v. Helm,
the defendant was sentenced to life in prison with no possibility of
parole.' Leandro Andrade is eligible for parole, after fifty years, in the
year 2046, when he is eighty-seven years old. In theory, there is a
distinction there; but everything we know about the life expectancy of
prisoners is that Leandro Andrade is going to die in prison. If there is
ever a distinction without a difference, this is it. But that is what the
Supreme Court says "contrary to, or an unreasonable application of
federal law means."
Some of you in this room are probably civil litigators or transactional
lawyers, and you say, "well that is the criminal justice system." Now let
us talk about the civil justice system. Not long ago I went to see a doctor
for the first time and the receptionist gave me a whole stack of papers
that I had to fill out before the physician would see me. I usually do not
31. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003).
32. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 69.
33. Andrade v. Att'y Gen., 270 F.3d 743, 767 (9th Cir. 2ooi).
34. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 77.
35. Id. at 66,70-77.
36. See id. at 73.
37. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
38. Id. at 281-82.
39. Id. at 303.
40. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 74 (citing Solum, 463 U.S. at 279).
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pay much attention to what I sign; I am not a good lawyer in that way,
but I noticed that one of the forms said that if I had any dispute with the
doctor, it would go to arbitration, and I was waiving my ability to go to
court. I went to the receptionist and I said, "I don't want to sign this
form. Will the doctor still see me?" She said, "I don't know; nobody has
ever refused to sign it before." She said, "I have to check with the
doctor." She came back and thankfully said, "Yes, the doctor will see
you." I imagine this is a doctor who sees a large number of patients every
day, and I am the first one to say I would not sign the form. This
happened to be one physician in Los Angeles, California. How many
others across country routinely ask that people, if they are injured, give
up ability to go to court?
Around the same time, I bought a new computer; it was from Dell.
Being interested in this, I happened to read the fine print that came with
it (and I, again, never do that). Sure enough, there was a clause that said
by buying the computer and by turning it on, I was agreeing that any
dispute that I would have with Dell would then go to arbitration.
I sent a letter back to Dell saying "I do not consent to this and by
opening my letter you hereby consent that I can take you to court." True
story. I am pleased to report the computer has worked fine; I have had
no occasion for suing Dell.
I looked, in researching for this Speech, to try to find out what
percentage of civil disputes now go to arbitration rather than to the
adjudicatory process in court. I could not find those statistics. Maybe
they exist. My sense is that there has been a dramatic increase in the
number of cases that go to arbitration, but it is hard to know what has
been the shift from the adjudicatory process to the arbitration process in
part, of course, because arbitrations are not reported.
Here too, the Supreme Court, especially in recent years, has
tremendously fueled the shift from court adjudication to arbitration. A
key Supreme Court decision earlier this decade was Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams.4' It involved an employee of Circuit City here in
California." He believed that he was the victim of discrimination.43 His
lawyer-a very astute lawyer who paid careful attention in law school-
decided he was much better off filing solely under California
antidiscrimination law in a California court." The lawyer clearly did not
want the case, probably for a variety of reasons, to go to federal court.
Since he was suing just under California law, in California court, it could
not be removed.
41. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
42. Id. at Io9-Io.
43. Id. at i1O.
44. See id.
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Circuit City filed a separate action in federal district court to compel
arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act.45 There is an exception to
the Federal Arbitration Act, a law passed in 1925, that says that
arbitration is not required for claims by, and I am now quoting you the
exact language, "seamen, railroad workers and other employees in
foreign or interstate commerce. '' 6 The Ninth Circuit said that the
Federal Arbitration Act does not apply here." By definition, Adams is an
employee in interstate commerce. The Federal Arbitration Act says that
arbitration is not required if it is an employment dispute for somebody
who is in interstate commerce."
The Supreme Court, five to four, reversed.49 It is interesting, the
majority was comprised of the same five Justices who were in the
majority in Lockyer v. Andrade." They interpreted the statute to say that
"employees in interstate commerce" only refers to transportation
workers;5 that if it is a transportation worker, then there cannot be
mandatory arbitration, but for any other employees, then the Act
applies. And this applies not just in Adams' case, but in countless other
cases of employees with discrimination and other claims who must go to
court rather than arbitration.
There was a Supreme Court decision two years ago about
arbitration. My guess is that if I ask for a show of hands almost no one in
this room would have heard of it unless you specialize in alternative
dispute resolution. It is a case called Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v.
Cardegna3 The case involves a business in the State of Florida that
cashes checks, especially for day laborers and others who get paychecks
on a weekly basis. 4 The business charges an exorbitant rate for cashing
these checks." In order for an individual to get to use this check cashing
service, he or she has to sign an agreement that any dispute will go to
arbitration. 6
A challenge was brought as to whether the interest, the amount of
money that is charged, in order to cash the check, violates Florida law. 7
The question that was raised for the Florida courts was whether they
45. Id.
46. 9 U.S.C. § I (2oo6).
47. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. i05, 110 (2001).
48. See 9 U.S.C. § i.
49. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 107, 124.
5o. Id. at io7; see Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 65 (2003).
51. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at Ii9.
52. Id.
53. 546 U.S. 440, 442 (2006).
54. Id. at 442-43.
55. Id. at 443.
56. Id. at 442-43.
57. Id. at 443.
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could hold the arbitration clause invalid on unconscionability grounds?
58
I am not a contracts law expert. I do not remember all that much from
first year contracts. I know it is hard to challenge contracts as being
unconscionable. But I would also think, if any contract rises to the level
of unconscionability, this is it. In order to cash your check, you sign an
agreement and one part of the fine print says if you have a dispute over
it, you can go to arbitration, not to court. 9 There is no bargained-for
exchange. If ever there is a contract of adhesion, this is it.
The Florida Supreme Court ruled that a court could declare this
contract, this specific term, invalid under unconscionability grounds and
then the matter would not have to go to arbitration. 6' The United States
Supreme Court reversed. 6' The Supreme Court said that the question of
whether or not the arbitration clause is unconscionable has to be
resolved in arbitration. 6' That is a tremendous favoring of arbitration
over the civil adjudicatory process.
When I talk about closing the courthouse door, the place where it
has been most so is with regard to civil rights litigants. It is very difficult
now for some kinds of civil rights plaintiffs to get to court at all. Over the
last decade, the Supreme Court has made it impossible for individuals to
be able to bring causes of action under federal civil rights statutes that do
not expressly contain them.
I know this sounds abstract, so let me give you a specific example.
Some of the most important tools in civil rights litigation for the last
couple of decades have been regulations adopted under Title VI of the
1964 Civil Rights Act. The 1964 Civil Rights Act, in Title VI, says
recipients of federal funds cannot discriminate based on race.
63
Regulations that were adopted by the then Department of Health,
Education and Welfare said that recipients of federal funds cannot
engage in practices that have a racially discriminatory impact.
64
I am sure you have all heard about the environmental justice
litigation that is gone on around the country, challenging the fact that
power plants, or toxic waste dumps, or garbage sites are much more
likely to be located in poor minority communities than in more affluent
58. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 824 So. 2d 228, 229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
59. Id. at 228.
60. Cardegna v. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc., 894 So. 2d 86o, 864-65 (Fla. 2005).
6i. Buckeye, 546 U.S. at 449.
62. Id. at 445-46, 449.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2006).
64. 45 C.F.R. § 8o.3(b)(2) (2oo7) (forbidding recipients of federal funds from "utiliz[ing] criteria
or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because
of their race, color, or national origin" (emphasis added)).
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areas. All of that litigation occurred under the Title VI regulations that I
have just described."
In Los Angeles, there was a major lawsuit brought challenging how
the bus lines were drawn.6 It turns out that the bus lines were drawn very
much to favor the affluent white communities at the disadvantage of the
poor minority communities. If you are in a white community, it is much
more likely in Los Angeles that you will get a direct bus route. If you are
in a poor minority community, it is much more likely you are going to
have to take three or four buses to get where you want. A challenge was
brought under those Title VI regulations.
67
Just a few years ago, in a case called Alexander v. Sandoval, the
Supreme Court, five to four, with the same five Justices in the majorities
in the other cases I mentioned, ruled that there can be no lawsuit to
enforce the Title VI regulations.66
The Supreme Court has tremendously decreased the ability of civil
rights plaintiffs, if they succeed, to get attorneys' fees. Again, these are
not the cases that make headlines, and if you do not do civil rights
litigation, there is not much reason you would know about them. But
several years ago, in a case called Buckhannon v. West Virginia
Department of Health & Human Resources, the Supreme Court said if
the government voluntarily changes its practices, or if a private
defendant voluntarily changes its practices, it is not liable for attorneys'
fees, even if the lawsuit against it was the catalyst for reform.
69
What that particular case involved was a lawsuit against the state of
West Virginia and its agency for discriminating against patients with
disabilities and elderly patients.7" The litigation went on for almost two
65. See, e.g., Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 944 F. Supp. 413, 414 (E.D.
Pa. 1996); In re Shintech, Inc., Permit Nos. 2466-VO, 2467-VO, 2468-VO (EPA Sept. lO, 1997) (order
partially granting and partially denying petitions for objection to permits), available at
http://www.epa.gov/Region7/programs/artd/air/title5/t5memos/shini997.pdf; In re La. Dept. of Envtl.
Quality/Permit for Proposed Shintech Facility, Draft Revised Demographic Information for Title VI,
Administrative Complaint File No. 4R-97-R6 (EPA Apr. 1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/
ocrpages/docs/shintech/apr98/cover48.pdf; Letter from Ann E. Goode, Director, EPA, Office of Civil
Rights, to Father Phil Schmitter & Sister Joanne Chiaverini, Co-Directors, St. Francis Prayer Ctr., &
Russell Harding, Director, Mich. Dep't of Envtl. Quality (Oct. 30, 1998), available at
http://www.epa.gov/civilrights/docs/ssdec ir.pdf; Letter from Russell Harding, Director, Mich. Dep't of
Envtl. Quality, to Father Phil Schmitter & Sister Joanne Chiaverini, Co-Directors, St. Francis Prayer
Ctr. (EPA File No. 5R-98-R5), available at http://www.epa.gov/civilrights/docs/ssdecjir.pdf; Summary
of Decision on Title VI Complaint Regarding Michigan Department of Environmental Quality's
Permit for the Proposed Select Steel Facility, http://www.epa.gov/ocr/sssumi.htm (last visited May I7,
2009).
66. Labor/Cmty. Strategy Ctr. v. L.A. County Metro. Transp. Auth., 263 F.3d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir.
2001).
67. Id.
68. 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001).
69. 532 U.S. 598, 60o (2OOs).
70. Id. at 6oo-oi.
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years." Right before the judge was going to clearly rule against the
defendant, the state simply changed its policy voluntarily and did
everything that the plaintiffs had been asking for.72 The plaintiffs came
forward and said, "We're the catalyst for this change. We should get
attorneys' fees."" Every circuit but one, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, had accepted the catalyst theory.74
Unfortunately, West Virginia is in the Fourth Circuit, so the plaintiffs
lost, and they went to the Supreme Court.75
The Supreme Court, five to four, with the same five Justices in the
majorities as each of other cases that I have talked about, said that
plaintiffs are not entitled to attorneys' fees unless the reform comes
directly from a court action-either a judgment or a court approved
settlement. 6 A voluntary change in policy cannot be the basis for
attorneys' fees, even if the plaintiffs' suit is the catalyst for it.77 If you
represent defendants, and there is a suit where your client might be liable
for attorneys' fees, there is a lesson here: just change your policy the day
before the court order, and you protect your client from attorneys' fees.
But if you are a lawyer whose organization or practice depends on
attorneys' fees, the ability to get them has been tremendously limited.
Just last year, the Supreme Court, in another case, said if a plaintiff
succeeds in getting a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff is not entitled to
attorneys' fees unless there is then a permanent injunction issued. 8
Imagine that a plaintiff sues to get a preliminary injunction, against any
unconstitutional, illegal practice. Imagine the preliminary injunction is in
place for ten years. The plaintiff has surely substantially prevailed. But
then imagine that plaintiff does not get the permanent injunction.
According to the Supreme Court last year, there can be no attorneys'
fees.79
Let me give one more example from the civil justice system that, to
me, is all about a Supreme Court that has lost faith in part of the system:
that is the Supreme Court decisions from the last decade that limit the
ability of juries to award punitive damages and empower courts to
overturn punitive damage awards. Substantial limits have been imposed
in this regard. The Supreme Court has said, for example, that generally
punitive damages have to be in a single digit ratio to compensatory
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 6oi.
74. Id. at 602 n.3.
75. Id. at 6ol-02.
76. Id. at 604-05.
77. Id. at 6o 5 .
78. Sole v. Wyner, 127 S. Ct. 2188, 2192 (2007).
79. Id.
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damages-that generally they cannot be more than nine to one." I
wonder where a majority that believes in strict construction of the
Constitution comes up with this rule.
Or, another example is from last year, in 2007, Philip Morris USA v.
Williams.8 The Supreme Court said punitive damages have to punish a
defendant just for harm suffered by that plaintiff; they cannot be to
punish a defendant for harm suffered by third parties.8" This is a dramatic
change in the law of punitive damages. Always punitive damages were to
punish, to deter. Again, where does this come from?
The same year that I argued and lost Lockyer v. Andrade in the
Supreme Court, I argued and lost a case in the California Court of
Appeal called Romo v. Ford Motor Co.3 The Romo family had bought a
1978 Ford Bronco, and Ford knew when it made this particular vehicle
that it was terribly dangerous. 4 It had a propensity to roll over, and Ford
did not include a rollover bar." At the trial, lawyers put before the jury
documentation that Ford knew about this, but it wanted to rush the
vehicle to market to be able to challenge the Chevy Blazer, and it felt
that it could just absorb the damages.
The Romo family was driving, they had a rollover accident, three
members of family died, and three were seriously injured."6 A jury, here
in California, awarded them $6 million in compensatory damages, and
$285 million in punitive damages." The California Court of Appeal
approved the punitive damage award." In a published opinion, the
California Court of Appeal said, based on the evidence before the jury,
what Ford did here was tantamount to manslaughter.
89
The Supreme Court then decided State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance
Co. v. Campbell, in 2003."' That was the case that said punitive damages
should generally be in a single digit ratio to compensatory damages.9' The
Supreme Court sent Romo v. Ford back to the California Court of
Appeal and the California Court of Appeal reduced the $285 million
punitive damage award to $23 million in punitive damages.92 It is still a
8o. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 4o8, 425 (2003).
8i. 549 U.S. 346 (2oo7).
82. Id. at 353.
83. 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
84. Id. at 797-98, 8o6.
85. Id. at 8o6.
86. Id. at 797-98.
87. Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139, 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
88. Id. at 145.
89. Id.
90. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
9
I
. Id. at 425.
92. Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793,812-13 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
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substantial amount, but it was a horrible feeling to have to call and tell
my client that I lost them about $260 million.
All I could think that day, and I know it sounds terribly cynical, was
to compare Lockyer v. Andrade and Romo v. Ford. I said that I guess the
principle of my legal practice for this year is: too many years in prison for
shoplifting does not bother the court, but too much money from a
corporation in punitive damages is unacceptable.
Let me talk about a third and final area with regard to access to the
courts and faith in the adjudicatory process: civil liberties in the War on
Terror. I believe that the most important legal issues for this decade,
maybe for our generation, concern civil liberties in the War on Terror. I
think there is no place where we more see a loss of faith in the
adjudicatory process, at least by the executive branch, than here. Think
about some of the things that have gone on since September i ith. One
thing we know is the claim of authority to detain people without
providing due process or judicial review. I would ask you to each ask
yourself a simple question: how many people is the United States
government now detaining, or has it detained as part of the War on
Terror since September II, 200?
I am confident that no one in this room knows the answer to that
question, because the government will not tell us. Until December 31st
of 2001, the government announced the number of noncitizens it was
holding as part of the War on Terror for immigration violations. They
then said that they would not tell that number anymore. They have never
disclosed the number of individuals being held on material witness
warrants. They have never told the number who are being held in CIA
rendition camps across the world.
Several years ago, I debated Michael Chertoff, the head of the
Department of Homeland Security, at a judicial conference. I asked this
question: "How many people is the government detaining or has it
detained as part of the War on Terror?" He said, "I can't tell you. That's
classified information." I said, "I'm a simple law professor, but I don't
understand how it would hurt national security if you tell us it's five
hundred, five thousand, or fifteen thousand." He refused to answer.
We know of examples. We know that Jose Padilla was apprehended
at the Chicago airport in May of 2002 and held without any form of
hearing, due process, or judicial review until late December of 2005,
when he was criminally charged.93
We know that Ali al-Marri is an individual who is a student at
Bradley University in Peoria, Illinois; a noncitizen, though a lawful, long
93. Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. lO62, io62-63 (2006) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (denying certiorari).
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term resident alien.' We know, with regard to him, that he was
apprehended in 2002, we are now in April of 2008, and he has never had
any form of hearing, administrative or judicial.95 We know that there
have been as many as 700 people in Guantinamo Bay, Cuba." There
have been the Combatant Status Review Tribunals, but even the man
who was the liaison between the CIA and the Justice Department said
that they were a sham.'
I have been representing a GuantAnamo detainee since the summer
of 2002; Saleem Gborchi. I do not know why he is being held. He claims
he does not know. The Bush administration has consistently taken the
position that there should be no judicial review, in fact, no access to the
federal courts, for those who are held as Guantinamo detainees.0
The Supreme Court, in Rasul v. Bush, in 2004, said that
Guantfnamo detainees have access to federal courts via a writ of habeas
corpus.' But Congress then passed the Detainee Treatment Act'°1 and,
more recently, the Military Commissions Act of 2006, that says that
noncitizens held as enemy combatants shall not have access to any
federal court via writ of habeas corpus.'0 ' If there is a military proceeding
against them, and I emphasize the "if" because there is nothing in the law
that requires it, they then can get review in the D.C. Circuit, but only for
claims under the Constitution and federal statutes; no court can ever
review claims under treaties, like the Geneva Accords. 2
Where the government has provided procedures, they do not meet
the most minimal nature of due process or international accords with
regard to human rights. I already spoke of the Combatant Status Review
Tribunals. If you are familiar with them you know, they are entirely ex
parte. The Guantinamo detainee is not entitled to have an attorney or
any representative. There is no standard of proof really on the
government; it is just a question of do they believe there is enough to
detain somebody. The Combatant Status Review Tribunal has no
94. Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cit. 2008).
95. Id.
96. David Bowker & David Kaye, Guantdnamo by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1O, 2007, at
A15.
97. See William Glaberson, Unlikely Adversary Arises to Criticize Detainee Hearings, N.Y. TIMES,
Jul. 23, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2o07/o7/23/us/23gitmo.html?pagewanted=i&sq=
stephen%2oabraham&st=cse&scp=i.
98. See William Glaberson, In Shift, Justices Agree to Review Detainees' Case, N.Y. TIMES, June
30, 2007, available at http://www.nytiMes.com2oo7/o6/3o/washington/3oscotus.html?scp=26&sq=bush+
guantanamo+review&st=nyt.
99. 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004).
100. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 1I9 Stat. 2739 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2ooodd (2oo6)).
tot. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 1O9-366, t2o Stat. 2600, 2635-36 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006)).
102. Boumediene v. Bush, r28 S. Ct. 2229, 2288 (2008).
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meaningful rules of evidence, nothing that we would associate with the
rudiments of due process.
The Bush administration promulgated rules for military tribunals.
Those rules would allow those being prosecuted, including facing
potential death sentences, to be completely excluded from the
proceedings against them and even their lawyers to be excluded against
them. It would allow evidence gained by torture to be used against them.
The Supreme Court found these procedures to be inconsistent with the
Geneva Accords and also the Uniform Code of Military Justice.'
Congress then passed the Military Commissions Act. In some ways,
the procedures under that act are better than the under the Bush
executive order, but they still do not meet international law. Still there is
more ability to exclude a defendant than international law would allow.
Even more troubling, still there is the ability to use evidence against
somebody, gained by torture, so long as the trier of fact finds it to be
reliable. 4 I do not know how evidence gained by torture could ever be
reliable.
So far, the Supreme Court has had a mixed record with regard to its
faith in process when it comes to civil liberties in the War on Terror. In
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, in 2004, the Supreme Court held, five to four, that
the United States government may detain United States citizens,
apprehended in a foreign country, held in the United States, as enemy
combatants-.' 5 The Supreme Court did say that these individuals have to
be given due process, but Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court,
outlined what due process required. It is very troubling. One thing she
said is the government could put the burden of proof on the individual to
show that he or she is not an enemy combatant.' ° Proving a negative is
always incredibly difficult. I am not sure how I can prove to you that I am
not an enemy combatant, let alone how Yasser Hamdi could prove that.
This seems inconsistent, again, with our basic constitutional norms, to say
nothing of international human rights.
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, in 2006, the Supreme Court, five to three,
ruled that the procedures for military commissions did not meet the
requirements of the Geneva Accords and the Uniform Code of Military
Justice.'" But it was five to three. John Roberts recused himself because
he had been part of the D.C. Circuit panel that ruled against Hamdan; so
there is reason to believe that it would have been five to four had
Roberts participated. Most recently, in June 2008, in Boumediene v.
103. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557,625 (2006).
104. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2260.
105. 542 U.S. 507,519 (2004).
io6. Id. at 533-34.
107. 548 U.S. at 625.
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Bush, the Supreme Court held that the Military Commissions Act of
2oo6 is an unconstitutional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in
denying enemy combatants access to federal court via habeas corpus."'
I said at the outset I was going to paint with a broad brush, because I
do believe that the whole needs to be focused on. Now, I can go back
through each of the areas that I talked about and suggest for you
particular reforms to change it. I would change the guilty plea process to
require that there be a meaningful hearing where a judge determines that
there is a basis for believing that the defendant is guilty before a guilty
plea is accepted. It would be inefficient, but it would lessen the likelihood
that innocent people would be imprisoned as a result of the pressures
that lead to guilty pleas.
I would hope that the new President and the new Congress would
reconsider some of the draconian provisions of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act. I am not optimistic about it. When is the
last time that Congress or a state legislature passed a law that expanded
the rights of criminal defendants or prisoners?
I think the Federal Arbitration Act can be revised to preserve the
ability for adjudication in a wide range of cases. I think there can be an
omnibus civil rights act that better protects the ability of civil rights and
civil liberties litigants to have access to the courts and get attorneys' fees.
I am hopeful that a different administration will more respect the need
for adjudication and fair process with regard to the War on Terror.
But I worry that to just focus on each of these examples is again to
lose sight of the overall picture. I worry that all of this, as I said in my
introduction is about a Court, an administration, maybe a society that is
losing faith in our adjudicatory process. So I conclude by asking you the
question that I started with. Over the time that you have been attorneys
or law professors or, for that matter, law students, have the processes of
criminal and civil adjudication become better? Are we doing a better job
now than when you began law school of living up to the constitutional
axioms that we all learned in junior high school?
The late Justice William Douglas said we will not lose our freedoms
all at once. He says it is the nature of erosion of liberty that it will happen
incrementally, a little bit at a time," 9 and I worry that is what is happening
with regard to the most basic notions of fairness and due process.
io8. 128 S. Ct. at 2229.
lO9. THE DOUGLAS LETrERS: SELECTIONS FROM THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS
162 (Melvin I. Urofsky & Philip E. Urofsky eds., 1987) ("As nightfall does not come all at once,
neither does oppression. In both instances, there is a twilight when everything remains seemingly
unchanged. And it is in such twilight that we all must be most aware of change in the air-however
slight-lest we become unwitting victims of the darkness.").
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